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Abstract 
This thesis presents an integrated overview of the historical and contemporary literature 
dedicated to the study of within-country income inequality in Latin America. As a sub-field of 
Developmental Economics, income inequality has been subject to increased interest in recent 
years due to its intrinsic link with poverty and its various policy-implications. The central 
hypothesis of this report is that there are underlying factors that drive the persistent levels of high 
within-country inequality, and that through analysis of the labor markets we can determine their 
link to inequality in specific cases. 
 Using macroeconomic indicators, statistics, empirical evidence and the wealth of 
knowledge compiled since the early 1980s, this study identifies driving factors and trends in 
income inequality. Focusing on periods of recession and post-stabilization growth in South 
American countries with unequal distributions of wealth, this report employs case-study 
methodology (see Chapters 5 and 6) based on supply-and-demand dynamics in the labor markets. 
This thesis’ main findings are that the political and economic reforms during the post-1980s 
contributed to worsening income disparity in Latin America. Further analysis suggests that FDI 
and debt crises, cultural norms, market liberalization policies, ethnic and urban-rural disparities, 
and poor educational institutions are highly correlated factors as well.  
The limitations of this research are, firstly, that regression analysis is inconclusive. No 
strong correlation between growth and inequality can be observed, even in highly unequal 
regions of Latin America. Further, tax data, which provides the basis for measurements of 
income inequality, varies from country to country, making statistical analysis difficult.  Lastly, 
data was not collectible until the early 1980s, and has frequent missing observations, further 
complicating this task. Thus, this report bases its findings on macroeconomic indicators, 
empirical research, and economic theory in explaining the factors and causes of inequality. 
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Summary 
Part I presents the historical and economic context for the study of inequality. Chapter 1 
describes the measures social scientists use to study within-country inequality, and how 
inequality is understood within the traditional principles of macroeconomic supply and demand 
in the labor markets. Chapter 2 presents a brief literature review relevant to the study of 
inequality pre- and post-1980s, then gives a brief overview of inequality, beginning in the latter 
half of the 20th Century. Following this discussion, emphasis is placed on the period from 1980 
to the present, when data becomes widely available on the topic. This section provides the 
theoretical and economic framework upon which to base our analysis 
Following our discussion of the basic economic framework behind inequality, emphasis 
is placed on when and how traditional models have broken down, citing both developed and 
underdeveloped regions as examples; finally, evidence and analysis is presented on the multiple 
factors that economists propose may have caused the shift in trends. In Chapter 3, we briefly 
consider how globalization and industrialization in the post-war era brought about debt crises 
and reform-periods across Latin America. We must understand this period, as the after-effects of 
this period brought about massive reforms and growth upon which this study will base its 
conclusions.  Consideration is given for how the developmental growth cycles experienced 
perpetuated or worsened income inequality in Latin America during the observed periods.  
In Part II, we apply the theoretical framework to case-studies on Brazil and Bolivia, 
examining the makeup of income with respect to the labor market changes occurring during this 
period. These countries provide two examples on opposing ends of the developmental spectrum 
– Brazil is currently a booming economic power, while Bolivia is one of the poorest and least 
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developed countries in the world – yet both suffer from chronic income inequality.  We conduct 
analysis on supply and demand fluctuations in the labor markets. Similarities and differences in 
the social, political, and economic history of each country are considered.   
 In the final chapter, a unified set of conclusions on the causes of perpetual income 
disparity in Latin America are developed, building the cohesive “driving-factor” theory behind 
inequality in this region. Following discussion of these underlying factors, the policy 
implications of the findings are considered, final conclusions reached and defended, and closing 
notes presented. 
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Part I 
 
Chapter 1 
Income Inequality: Introduction and Overview 
In analyzing income inequality, it is useful first to understand conceptually and 
practically what it is. At the most fundamental level, “inequality is the absence of equality” and 
therefore, income inequality refers to a state in which national or global wealth is unevenly 
distributed (Firebaugh, 2003, p. 71). 
The best way to describe within-country inequality, the topic of interest for this study, is 
with an example: if national income, delineated by $X, is spread over the entire population, N, in 
such a manner that each person owns $/ dollars, then the country exhibits perfect equality in 
its distribution of wealth. That is to say, if every member of the country owns their true share of 
income per capita, then we have an equal distribution. 
Further, it is necessary to distinguish between within-country and global or regional 
inequality. Firebaugh (2003) explains that between-country inequality deals with global income 
differences across nations, in effect studying why some nations make less GDP or own 
significantly less shares of world output than other countries. However, within-country 
inequality is concerned with inequality of the distribution of a country’s national income 
amongst the population of that country. 
Lastly, it is crucial to differentiate inequality and inequity, as the two are often used 
interchangeably, yet actually represent entirely different concepts. For example, take the 
distribution of lollipops amongst a class of fifth graders. 
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What is An Equitable Distribution of Lollipops? 
Lollipop equity in this case evokes normative statements, meaning it is generally 
discussed in terms of opinions or value-judgments. That is to say, ‘I think this many lollipops 
seems most fair,’ or better yet, ‘drawing on past experiences, I have concluded that giving the 
most lollipops to whoever needs them the most is the just distribution’. This, however, must be 
distinguished from lollipop equality. 
What is An Equal Distribution of Lollipops? 
Lollipop equality is a state in which all lollipops are distributed in a mathematically equal 
manner to each member of the class. This makes no claims on what is a fair or just allocation of 
those lollipops, but represents a purely mathematical allocation. For income, this same principle 
is applied: income inequality simply analyzes wages and earnings data for a given nation across 
the entire populous, comparing it to the mathematically equal distribution. 
How We Measure Income Inequality 
In 1905, Max O. Lorenz developed the Lorenz Curve, which plots the share of income 
against income share. Using a metric measuring the population, in this case the % of households, 
from poorest to richest on the x-axis against, we see their corresponding income share on the y-
axis; the further below the line of equality, the less equal the distribution (see Figure 1.1).    
 Today, the most common metric used to measure within-nation income inequality is the 
Gini coefficient. This uses ratio analysis to measure the area between the line of perfect equality 
and the Lorenz curve diagram, representing the result as an index between 0 and 1, with 1 
representing perfect inequality and 0 representing perfect equality (Figure 1.2). 
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 First published in 1912 by Italian Corrodo Gini, the Gini index remains the most common 
mechanism used today with which to measure inequality.1 Due to its derivation, the Gini is most 
sensitive to income transfers in the middle regions, leaving the upper and lower regions 
relatively unaffected. Thus, it is used more in international sources and studies than any other 
measure (Barros, 2009). 
The other tool which this report employs is analysis on specific regions of the income 
distribution. In other words, we consider nth percentiles of the earnings composition. 2  This 
allows us to analyze trends over time, as income shifts in different regions of the distribution in 
response to fluctuations in the national labor markets.  
 To obtain these measures, we require tax information from reliable sources across a large 
population, which presented a practical problem in many underdeveloped countries until the 
1980s, when data became widely available. Today, income inequality is measured using 
consumption, income and national earnings data, gathered from national and international 
surveys and tax data (Barros, 2009, p. 23). 
What Determines the Distribution of Income? 
While the goal of this thesis is to identify what causes persistently high levels of income 
inequality, one underlying principle must be made clear: the mechanism by which redistribution 
comes about is via the labor markets as we understand it in a traditional macroeconomic 
framework. Simply put, a macroeconomic notion of supply and demand in the labor markets 
actually determines the composition of within-country income. To explain it with this 
perspective, we describe the labor markets as such:  
                                                          
1
 For more see (Gini, 1912) 
2
 This report uses decile and quintile analysis. 
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• there are two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, denoted as  and   
• they are available in quantities   + =  	 
• they receive wages   
 + 
 = 
 	 
• the wage-differential, wage-premium, or wage-disparity gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers is   
 / 
 
(note: example changed slightly, but drawn from Atkinson, 2009, p. 87) 
In this case, we can represent the labor markets with a basic supply and demand diagram 
(see Figure 3). In this model, the equilibrium wage and quantity of laborers ( 	, 
 	) is 
determined by the point of intersection between the supply curve for labor  	, 
 	 and 
demand of labor  	, 
 	 (See Figure 1.3). 
For purposes of measuring wage dispersion, it is useful to further decompose this model 
into a relative comparison between skilled and unskilled workers.  In this case, we assess 
demand of skilled workers relative to the demand for unskilled, or supply of skilled workers 
relative to unskilled, at the corresponding relative wage gap. In this case: 
• relative demand for skilled workers is  / ,   
 / 
 
• relative demand for unskilled workers is  / ,   
 / 
 
• relative supply of skilled workers is   / ,   
 / 
 
• relative supply of unskilled workers is  / ,   
 / 
 
From history, we note that skilled workers tend to form the majority of the upper 
distributions of income and unskilled traditionally the lower.  The relative supply and demand 
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framework provides more nuanced insights, as it enables us to capture demand, supply, and wage 
disparities not only over time, but in any given year. 
Now, we see how these play out in the markets according to traditional macroeconomic 
supply-and-demand models. When demand increases with constant supply, then workers have 
higher bargaining power, leading to a higher wage-equilibrium.3 Conversely, decreases in 
demand cause firms to raise prices and lower the bargaining region, leading to lower wages in 
the same manner. For supply increases at a constant wage, higher amounts of workers enable 
firms to be more selective, and at the same time, offer lower wages. A decrease relative or 
aggregate supply creates a leftward shift of the supply line, putting upward pressure on wages, as 
labor inputs are relatively fewer. Shifts in supply and demand can be caused by any number of 
things – in many cases economic and political reform, and in others, debt – but the after-effects 
are clear: fluctuating demand or supply in the labor markets can cause both short and long-term 
shifts in the allocation of wages or relative wages, as initial shifts are met by secondary-level 
shifts in the medium to long-run, affecting national earnings composition. 
Supply and demand dynamics provide with a basic understanding of how within-country 
income inequality is measured statistically, and with what data. Now, we must we understand 
how to use traditional economic models to describe the underlying mechanisms that connect the 
labor markets to national income distribution. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Equilibrium = market clearing, or Pareto efficient point of (P, Q)  or in this case (P, W)  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
There were important contributions to the field of inequality during the post-war era. As a 
result of increased interest in equity and poverty-reduction, many economists and researchers 
began to study it extensively. Particularly, industrialization increased drastically during this time, 
contributing 38.3% value added to world GDP in 1970 (World Databank, 2010, Industry Value 
Added). The effect of this rise in the industrial employment is what prompted Simon Kuznets’ 
investigation into income disparity. 
Industrialization, Kuznets, and the U-Curve Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis regarding national income inequality came about in 1954, when 
Simon Kuznets proposed what has now come to be called “The Kuznets Hypothesis”. He built a 
model dividing developing economies into agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and noted 
that development was characterized by shifting labor from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors. 
In this model, he found that when agricultural wages and average incomes were lower than in the 
non-agricultural sectors receiving the inflow of labor, inequality increased initially, then fell in 
the long-run. From our framework, this can be explained as increases in labor supply raising 
competition, decreasing worker bargaining power, and lowering wages; at the same time, while 
the wage premium increases in skill-intensive sectors. 
In 1966, he proposed the official “Kuznets U-Curve Hypothesis”, noting that as countries 
experienced early stages of economic growth, their income inequality rose, but then decreased 
again once they surpassed a certain developmental threshold (Kuznets, 1966). He reasoned that 
industrialization boosts inequality initially because of employment shifts from agriculture to 
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emerging financial and industrial markets. This relates intrinsically to inequality, as this shift has 
a redistributive effect on wages, especially in the industrial sector, where skilled labor dominates.  
 Kuznets also observed lower income inequality in developed regions, leading him to 
formulate a theory expressing “long-term trend towards the diminution of inequality once a 
certain level of economic development had been reached” (Lecaillon, 1984, p. 8).  This gave 
birth to the notion of the U-curve curve relation, with inequality on the vertical-axis and some 
measure of growth, often income or GDP per capita, on the x-axis (See Figure 2.1). This theory 
suggests that we see the highest rate of inequality in the middle stages of development, and low 
inequality only at the earliest and latest stages. 
 Between 1960 and 1980, several studies seemed to confirm the existence of the Kuznets 
curve. Irving Kravis in 1960 found a positive correlation between the degree of inequality and 
income per capita; in 1973, Paukert compared the before-tax incomes of 56 countries, 40 of 
which were developing, finding that the Gini ratio was linked to the GDP per capita (Lecaillon, 
1984, p. 8-9). Other subsequent research also seemed to confirm this trend: in 1977, Lydall used 
World Bank data for 71 countries and estimated the actual turning-point of inequality. Monkek 
Ahluwalia (1974) corroborated the existence of the relation, and the Kuznets hypothesis. It was 
not until the 1980s that new theories began surfacing, as empirical evidence in numerous cases 
began to contradict the Kuznets curve. The following excerpt from Green et al, (2001) 
summarizes this changing trend: 
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                              (Source: ftp://ftp.ukc.ac.uk/pub/ejr/RePEc/ukc/ukcedp/0013.pdf) 
 
Newer Analysis Methods 
 With the advent of more sophisticated analytical techniques in recent decades, new ways 
to measure and study inequality have arisen. Alcaraz (2008) explains that the microeconomic 
approach to studying inequality involves scalar decomposition and simulation analyses of 
particular subsets of the income distribution, with respect to certain variables, such as age, 
location, ethnicity, or others. 4  However, this approach has limitations, as noted by Bourguignon 
et al. (2005): first, it often yields unexplainable residuals, and cannot account fully for omitted 
variables. Further, it doesn’t consider the entire distribution. For this reason, this report employs 
                                                          
4
 See Barros and Reis (1991), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996),  and Ferriera 
and Bourgiunon (2006) for examples 
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a macroeconomic understanding of the various forces acting labor market forces, and their 
distributional effects. 
Contradicting Empirical Evidence & the Breakdown of Kuznets’ U-Curve Relationship 
 From 1980 to the present, the empirical evidence begins to contradict Kuznets 
Hypothesis in both developed and undeveloped regions. Europe and the United States 
experienced high incidence of income inequality despite reaching the later stages of development 
(Gottschalk, 1997; Korzeniewicz, 2009).  On the other side, many developing countries, such as 
those in Latin America, did not see their income inequality plateau or shrink, even during times 
of post-stabilization growth (ECLAC, 2010, Total GDP). 
 Cases of developed nations experiencing rises in inequality directly contradicts Kuznets 
hypothesis, as theoretically their income distribution should be stable or improving at this stage 
in development. The United States stands out: from 1980-2004, the bottom decile dropped nearly 
10 percentage points, while the top decile rose nearly 15 percentage points (Gottschalk, 1997). 
Saez (2003) analyzed income data from 1913-1998 and found no evidence in support of a U-
shaped, Kuznets relation for inequality in the United States.  
There is similar discord in the evidence for developed Western European regions. 
Though between-country inequality has decreased since 1997, analysis by Bouvet (2010) shows 
that even in developed regions of Europe, inequality increased in the 1990s. The effects were 
most noticeable particularly the UK, who experienced a drastic increase in their national income 
inequality: during 1980-2000 period, the UK Gini coefficient rose by 36% (Korzeniewicz, 2009).  
Firebaugh (2003) proposes that these cases give us a “new geography of inequality” 
characterized by declining across-nation inequality accompanied by rising within-country 
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inequality.  In other words, what was not achieved, in many cases, is what Kakwani (2003) calls 
“pro-poor” growth, or growth that improves the income difference. 
How Latin America Defies the Kuznets Hypothesis 
Post-1980 the Gini coefficient worsened for many countries in Central and South 
America (ECLAC, 2010, Gini).  As we see from the ECLAC data, Brazil’s inequality grew from 
0.627 in 1990 to 0.640 in 1999, and Costa Rica grew from 0.438 in 1990 to 0.473 in 1999. Chile, 
Colombia, Venezuela and Costa Rica also worsened their income disparity during this time 
period. Honduras improved during this period, however remained a leader in inequality in both 
2003 and 2004. From this data, we find very few cases of countries whose income gap improved 
significantly during this period. Green et al. (2001) despite post-stabilization and high reform 
ratings 
 These rising Gini results lead to what Harrison and Bluestone (1988) call “the great U-
turn”. They argue that new empirical evidence represents a historical shift, calling into question 
the continued relevance of the inverted U-curve hypothesis. Before we explore the reasons for 
this shift, Chapter 3 will focus on setting the historical context for the recession and reform era in 
Latin America during the 1980s. 
 
  
 Contextual Factors: Globalization and Setting the Stage for the 1980s
Globalization: Trade, Technology and Immigration
The 20th century saw drastic increases in world GDP and GNI. 
World GNI per capita rose consistently from 1977
likely as a result of the Latin American Debt Crisis, and accelerating post
Databank, 2010, GNI Per Capita). GDP per capita followed a similar upward tr
only from 1981-1985 and briefly from 1996
growing by nearly $4000 from $5303.5 to $9153.1
Annual GDP evidence confirms this trend
1990s, and two brief drops in the later 1990s and early 2000s. confirms this world trend,     
Inequality
Globalization
Debt
Chapter 3: 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3.1, 
-1995, decreasing only from 1981
-1988 (World 
end, decreasing 
-1998, with accelerated growth from 2002 
 (World Databank, 2010, GDP Per Capita
, growing throughout 1980s, late 1980s and early 
Income 
Reform & 
Stabilization
Recession
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-1983, most 
-2008, 
).  
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increasing  from GDP annual growth was 4.1% in 1961; with the exception of two large drops 
from 1973--1975 (dropping from 6.5% - 0.9%), and from 1979--1982 (dropped 4.2%  -- 0.3%). 
Technological Change 
There was a drastic increase in communications and production-technologies during this 
era. These do have some negative external effects on inequality, as the technologies developed 
have a skill-bias (Katz and Murphy, 1992). One aspect of technological change is that the rapid 
technological advancements allowed for the fragmentation of the production process, leading to 
two key trends: vertical specialization and outsourcing (Irwin, 2005). Vertical specialization 
allows for “companies’ purchasing of intermediate goods and components on the market rather 
than producing them internally,” and, conversely, outsourcing allows for the transfer of labor 
inputs from domestic to foreign. The first of these trends inhibits domestic production, while 
shifting labor inputs, in large amounts, would cause supply fluctuations. 
Immigration & Labor Markets 
From a short-term perspective, “the entry of immigrants into a labor market should lower 
the wages of competing workers…and perhaps increase the wages of complementary workers” 
(Borjas, 2005).  Evidence also suggests that immigrants are more concentrated in lower-skill 
applications (Borjas et. al, 1997). Generally, immigration is thus thought to increase competition 
in unskilled labor positions, crowding out native labor, while simultaneously benefiting the 
wealthier natives. Data does indicate there is indeed a small negative correlation between 
immigration and wages, but it is not significant, while illegal immigration further complicates 
our understanding of this effect (Altanji and Card, 1990). On a basic level, immigration and trade 
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both have the effect of transferring resources from one economy to another, the former in the 
form of human and intellectual capital, the latter in terms of physical capital.  
Does Globalization and FDI Affect Income Inequality? 
 Nunnenkamp (2006) proposes that it creates better employment and earnings 
opportunities for unskilled workers. In economic terms, more capital means more jobs, which is 
followed by higher demand for workers and lower wage premiums for skilled workers. However, 
empirical evidence, especially for countries in Latin America, does not always confirm this. As 
Te Velde (2003) explains, FDI impacts income and wage inequality through its effects on fiscal 
policy and the heavy expenditures it requires in interest payments. Both of these not only detract 
from what a government can spend on social, health, and other developmental sectors, but lead 
rising interest rates, prices, and inflation, which affect supply and demand in the labor markets.  
At the very least, notes Te Velde, “micro and macro evidence shows that… FDI is likely to 
perpetuate inequalities” (Te Velde, 2003). 
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Chapter 4 
Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s: 
Crisis, Reform Post-Stabilization Growth, and Distributional Effects 
As discussed previously, the 1960s and 1970s show Latin America achieving sustained 
annual growth (See Figure 4.1). Many countries introduced market and trade friendly reforms, 
suffering increases in within-country income disparities as a consequence (Berry, 1997).  What 
draws our attention to Latin America is the amount of inequality experienced by nearly every 
country. As summarized in Psacharopoulos et al. (1997, p. 15-16): 
o Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama all have Gini coefficients 
exceeding 0.55 
o Similarly, bottom 20% of distribution receives less than 3% of the income in 
those same countries 
 Other regional trends make Latin America ideal for this study. Firstly, it is characterized 
by high historical wage differentials between workforce members with differing levels of 
education (Borjas, 2005; figure 4.2). Furthermore, the region experiences cultural tension and 
racism, as well as historical social and educational inequalities.  
 Numerous historical and social factors contribute in many countries to a deeply 
entrenched class-system. As Borjas (2005) points out, there is a persistent wage difference 
between immigrants and native labor. Over time, as immigrant laborers integrate into and 
participate in the host economy, increased supply of labor should drive down real wages as a 
result of increased competition and lowered wage-bargaining potential. 
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The “Lost Decade”, Reform, and Effects on Labor Markets 
The effects of the “Lost Decade” on the 1990s on the labor markets are of particular 
importance.  Unsurprisingly, GDP growth decreased markedly during 1980 – 1989 period (see 
Figure 4.4). The typical pattern during this period for Latin American countries, notes Morley 
(1995), was falling real wages and rising real exchange rates. To us, this suggests that either 
demand had decreased as a result of the recession, or supply had been increasing in labor 
markets had been increasing.  
In the  were forced to borrow to cover their deficits, causing a rise in real interest rates – 
and most of that borrowing coming from internal sources – the recession created a vicious cycle 
of inflation (Morley, 1995). This had numerous effects on the income distribution for each 
country, which we will examine in Chapters 6 and 7. 
An Era of Widespread Reform 
In most cases, the process of reform brought about similar changes across countries: the 
late 80s and early 90s were characterized by widespread financial liberalization, privatization, 
trade reform, tax reform, and capital reform (Green et al., 2009).  
 Unsurprisingly, poverty increased, and GDP growth decreased markedly during 1980 – 
1989 period, while many countries experienced large rises in inequality (see Figure 4.4). Most 
notably, Argentina, Brazil, and Panama had sharp rises in inequality while Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Peru had rising income inequality during the second half of the decade 
(Morley, 1995, p. 20). 
 Economist Albert Berry (2003), an expert on poverty and inequality studies, cites five 
key trends that characterized the reform-process in Latin America during this period: 
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1. Conservative macroeconomic policy: 
o Inflationary periods often precede periods of growth 
o Social hysteresis theories surround and exacerbate business 
cycle fluctuations 
2. Savings and investment policies 
o High savings, high investment in emergent markets 
3. Human capital accumulation 
o Extremely important to growth and inequality 
4. Technological change 
o Increases per worker productivity 
5. Pro-market policies 
o Includes financial liberalization, trade reform, tax reform, 
privatization, and other market friendly reforms 
 
 
Specific Reform Programs 
 There were programs employed nearly across-the-board during this period. We will only 
note a few of the most significant. Morley (1995) points out some significant reform packages 
employed during this time, noting the varying results:  
Chile program, PNAC, did not a focus on human capital and training, but rather menial 
and unskilled tasks, in an attempt to give more jobs to unskilled workers. However, many 
felt and expressed that the program was authoritarian, or debased workers, and thus it 
failed. Bolivia’s emergency plan (FES) represented a demand-driven set of reforms 
established by Estenssoro in 1985, which succeeded in ending hyperinflation and cutting 
poverty rates, only to see growth decrease again in the post-reform era. We will discuss 
this in Chapter 6. Peru offered the PAIT plan in 1985 under Alan Garcia, offering three-
month jobs at minimum wage for labor-intensive activities, such as reforestation, water and 
sewer construction, and other unskilled labor job; ultimately the PAIT failed in 1998 when Peru 
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faced a failing economy. The Perez plan in Venezuela took the difficult initiative of ending the 
costly price subsidies that had been costing the government an estimated $1 Billion per year, but 
saw limited success. El Plano real in Brazil, executed by Estenssoro in 1994, was the most 
successful anti-stabilization plan in Latin America, and led Brazil to becoming a worldwide 
economic power, for more on this see Chapter 6. 
 Morley et al. (1999) discusses the results of the reforms: Chile and Uruguay’s index 
changed more than 50% over the time period from 1970 to 1982. “Between 1985 and 1990, the 
significant reformers were Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Paraguay. After 1990, Brazil, Peru, the 
Dominican Republic, and El Salvador all raised their reform index by over 50%” (Morley, 1999; 
Figure 4.5). Ultimately, these massive reforms led Latin America back from recession to growth 
but each country took its own path though the reform process. We note a general trend of 
increasing regional GDP from the 1990s (post-reform) lasting until the 2000s, when Latin 
America and the Caribbean region’s average GDP increasing from 48.3 billion in to 66 billion in 
2000  (ECLAC, 2010, Total GDP).  However, the effects of this growth on the Gini coefficient 
for Latin America were ambiguous: despite a few larger fluctuations – rising to 0.602 in 1993 
then dropping a full point by 1995 0.507 – the Gini increased subtly from 0.541 in 1990 to 0.564 
in 2000 (ECLAC, 2010, Gini). 
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Chapter 5 
Explanations of Regional Inequality: The “Durable Inequality” of Latin America, Post-1980s 
Introduction 
Te Velde (2003) notes that there are some constant identifiable forces that drive the 
perpetual high inequality rates in Latin America. As Te Velde summarizes, human capital and 
education maintain income inequality; as one’s level of education determines their relative 
position on the income hierarchy, social mobility throughout most of Latin America is limited by 
poor educational opportunities.  We see this manifest in the high wage differential between 
skilled and unskilled workers, which is particularly evident between differing levels of education 
(figure 6.6) We consider the varying returns to education by level, and other factors such 
increases in supply of workers, entrenched class structure, and a corresponding wage differential, 
with a notable premium for  (figure xxx) 
A History of Class Structure and Inequality 
According to Korzeniewicz and Morgan (2009, p. 24), Latin America has a deeply 
entrenched class-system: “legally codified inequality intrinsic to slavery, and…the evolution of 
institutions that protected the privileges of the elites and restricted opportunities for the broad 
mass of the population.” Korzenievicz (2009) also speaks of “selective exclusion” that manifests 
itself commonly, wherein it is considered acceptable in many circumstances to prevent members 
of lower social classes from moving up, for example through denying opportunities in education, 
politics or employment. Simply put, members of the upper class apparently find it acceptable or 
even beneficial to deny social mobility opportunities to members of the lower classes.  
 There are certainly more factors that play into the problem of inequality, but they will 
surface throughout the examination in the following chapters. Each country is a unique case, 
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with their own cultural histories and social issues, which is why applying the framework we have 
developed to specific countries over specific time periods of decelerated and accelerated growth 
may illuminate the effects of the factors driving inequality; our task will be to find which reasons 
are most plausible based on empirical evidence.  While Part I can be seen as giving an in-depth 
overview, setting the context, and developing the framework for the study if inequality, Part II 
should conversely be seen as the “synthesis” section of this report. 
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Part II 
 
Synopsis 
Central Question: 
Why in periods of post-recession growth does the income disparity not improve? 
To answer this, we apply the framework developed in Part I to Brazil and Bolivia, studying 
the observable trends in inequality during the period of interest. Chapter 6 applies the framework 
we have set up to the case of Brazil in the post-reform period. Brazil is chosen as an example 
because it is a country that experienced massive growth resulting from reforms and stabilization, 
emerging as a player on the world-stage in the 2000s; at the same time, Brazil’s inequality of 
income only worsened (ECLAC, 2010, Gini).  Other socio-economic and political conditions 
that also contribute to inequality, such as poor health and education institutions, class-structure, 
and cultural perceptions, are considered in this section as well. 
Chapter 7 studies Bolivia, arguably the poorest and least-developed nation in Latin America.  
Our supply-and-demand framework, as well as the cultural elements that contribute to income 
inequality, such as the rural-urban divide, racism, and the heavily uneducated and poor 
agricultural populous, will be discussed in depth.  
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes and defends the conclusions reached in the previous chapters 
and attempts to put the findings in a wider context, considering political, economic, and social 
implications of this research. We briefly acknowledge the limitations of the findings, and the 
cases against the “driving-factor” hypothesis. Finally, we consider why inequality is such an 
important issue, with increased relevance the world, and why our findings only affirm the 
pertinence of addressing the issue.  
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Chapter 6: 
Brazil: Booming Economy, Booming Inequality 
Introduction: 
Attempts to measure Brazil’s income inequality were first made in 1960, the first year 
that data was collected on national income by the Brazilian census (Skidmore, 2004). Looking at 
these early attempts to characterize the income distribution suggest that Brazil has had consistent 
and grave problems with income inequality even as far back as mid-century. 
Historical Context: Colonialism, Slavery and Import-Substitution 
Brazil is the largest country in South America in terms of land, thus allowing access to 
nearly unlimited natural resources. Thus, Brazil has traditionally had a thriving agricultural 
sector, but the reform from 1988 on saw the advent of rapidly growing financial and industrial 
sectors. From 1950 to 1980 Brazil had the fastest growing economy in South America, growing 
at an annual rate of 4.3% (ECLAC, 2010, Total GDP).  
Analysis in this section will focus on the period of recession, from 1980-1994 and the 
effects of the reforms undertaken during the Cardoso presidency. After 1994, monetary 
stabilization brought about a period of prosperity, lasting for more than a decade. However, 
despite increases in annual GDP growth during this post-recession period, we find that Brazil’s 
level of inequality increased.  We examine briefly the causes of this persistent inequality. 
“The Lost Decade” and the Process of Reform: GDP Fluctuations 
As previously discussed, the 1980s saw a significant decline in production and growth. 
GDP growth amounted to less than 6% annually in the 1980s, going far below 0 in 1983, and 
taking until the 1990s to recover (Figure 6.1).  
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In 1988, the crisis led Brazil to begin a process of reform. By the Fernando Color de 
Melo administration, 1990-1992, the reform process began to accelerate (Rudra, 2008, p. 185).  
As Rudra explains, many people sometimes call this “the decade of market-oriented reforms”, as 
this period was characterized by the elimination of trade barriers, lowered tariff rates, the 
abolition of special import regimes, a floating exchange rate, and reduction of inward capital 
controls. Further, this period saw the privatization of public services and national companies, and 
substantial increases in foreign capital inflows, particularly foreign direct investment (Figure 
6.2). Brazil’s GDP arguably goes through two business cycles between 1980 and 1995, 
decreasing and even going below zero as a result of the recession, then recovering in 1986, only 
to decrease drastically again by 1990 (ECLAC, 2010, Total GDP).  
Despite increases in GDP growth, the currency failed to stabilize until 1994. It was 
during this year that Fernando Henrique Cardoso announced “El Plano Real” (The Real Plan) to 
stabilize the currency by pegging its value to the US dollar. This translated into huge decreases 
in inflation, post-1994, and led to monetary stabilization.  
Post-1994: Stabilization and Growth 
Although Cardoso and his reforms led Brazil to a state of economic growth from 1992 
on, the wealth generated was still disproportionately allocated across the country. There were 
decreases in poverty and absolute poverty, but we do not see the income gap improve by either 
the Gini coefficient or quintile analysis (Figure 6.3). 
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Labor Markets and Increased Competition 
Using the reform-indices shown earlier by Green (2001) we can see that Brazil’s reform 
process was generally slower than other Latin American countries. It was not until 1988 that we 
saw any significant improvements in the reform indices (Figure 6.4). 
 To examine the effects of these reforms, we turn to Brazil’s labor markets. During the 
1980s we see decreasing employment in agriculture overall (ECLAC, 2010, Labor Force). 
Following the 1980s, this data shows 1990 and 1992 as increasing employment in the 
agricultural sector again, only for it to continue on a downward trend, likely due to the effects of 
national industrialization and urban development in the post-stabilization period.  
Though male rates of participation and employment generally stayed very constant, we 
observe increases in the amount of females employed both in agriculture and industry, with a 
huge jump in between 1992 and 1993 (Figure 6.5). The participation rate is of particular interest 
here as well: during this period it remained above 80% for males, but began decreasing in the 
1990s, while the rate of females participating grew through both decades (ECLAC, 2010, 
Participation Rates). 
All the evidence suggests that the supply of labor increased remarkably during this 
period. Again, this favors more skilled workers, as they have the educational advantage in labor 
force competition. This all combines together to drive the increasing wage differential between 
skilled and unskilled workers. Additionally, we see that in post-1994, Brazil maintained a very 
high wage differential between educated and uneducated workers, improving minimally since 
1981, with college graduates making in some cases ten times the income of their illiterate 
counterparts (see Figure 6.6). During the equivalent time period, the Gini coefficient did not 
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increase or decrease significantly, rising modestly from 0.627 in 1990 to 0.637 in 1996 (ECLAC, 
Gini, 2010) 
Indices point to financial liberalization, capital account privatization, trade and tax 
reforms that occurred during this era as having large effects on the labor markets. Green et al in 
2000 conducts analysis on the effects of trade reform over the relevant period and finds that tariff 
rates play a large role in determining the industry wage premium, and thus the relative wage 
differential between skilled and unskilled. In addition, financial and tax reforms favoring skilled 
workers contributed to growth without redistribution. Green (2000) also finds significant effects 
related to the trade reforms: he finds a positive correlation between tariff rates and the industry 
wage, and as the trade reforms led to decreasing tariff rates  in the post-1980s, this at least 
partially explains the falling wages and stark contrast between upper and lower percentages of 
the distribution (Figure 6.7).  
Brazil:   Education, Separation 
Another problem Brazil faces is lack of wealth to devote to developing education institutions 
and other social development programs. In 1984, public spending on education was only 3.3% of 
GDP; in 1994, the year of the Real Plan and stabilization, the government only allotted 1.5% of 
GDP to education, devoting all of its resources to the new monetary and fiscal policies. By the 
ECLAC’s rating, even after the stabilization in 1994 led to recovery and growth, the government 
never devoted more than 5% of GDP in a year to education (ECLAC, Expenditures). As a result, 
Brazil has a very low quality public education system, low enrollment rates, and low literacy 
rates. (ECLAC, Literacy Rates) 
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Prior to 1980, only an estimated 70% of children went to primary school in Brazil. By 
1980, net enrollment had increased to above 80%, but did not increase during the recession 
period (See Figure 6.8). During the reform period and after 1994, net primary school enrollment 
rates fluctuate between 90% and 95% (ECLAC, Primary School Enrollment). 
There is a notable increase as a consequence of the reforms, helping Brazil to achieve 
average primary enrollment rates relative to other Latin American countries, but these figures are 
still low relative to first-world enrollment rates (ECLAC, Primary Enrollment) Secondary and 
tertiary enrollment rates tell a different story: average enrollment in secondary school was below 
20% in Brazil until 1994, which is extraordinarily low, below even Latin American averages 
(See Figure 6.9). Though secondary enrollment rates improved markedly by 2005 (up to 94.4%), 
we must conclude that low levels of education, leading to low labor force productivity, served to 
perpetuate inequality during this period (ECLAC, Secondary Enrollment). 
Rural-Urban Divide 
In Brazil, there is large contrast between the agricultural sectors – which largely employ 
the lesser-educated, rural populous – and the industrial and financial sectors, concentrated in 
urban areas. During the time period from 1990-2008, we see that the rural lowest regions 
actually improved their income share, while industry income share remained fairly constant; this 
is in large part due to the high returns Brazil experienced during this period through their 
exports, which played a large role in supporting growth (ECLAC, Quintiles)  However, neither 
decile nor quintile analysis show significant changes, but rather small fluctuations around an 
average which remains high, with no decreasing trend emerging despite Brazil’s advancement 
into later stages of development. This finding suggests that reform only played a small role in 
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inequality in Brazil, at worst perpetuating income inequality and causing implying that other 
cultural factors may be to blame.  
 All social indicators show that Brazil, despite its advanced stage of development, is far 
behind other countries with similar GDP outputs and levels of development.  Investigating 
government expenditures on health as a % of GDP only supports this conclusion, as it never 
reached above 3.6% GDP spending in the health sector (ECLAC, Expenditures on Health). Total 
social public expenditures were low as well the 1980s and early 1990s, only breaking 20% in 
1995, the first year after Brazil achieved monetary stabilization (ECLAC, Expenditures on Social 
Sector). 
Summary of Conclusions  
 Our final conclusions regarding Brazil are a bit unsettling: despite massive reforms and 
increases in wealth, increasing public expenditures in the social, health, and education sector, 
increasing labor force participation and literacy rates, we still see no improvements in the income 
disparity gap. For this reason, we must conclude that Brazil’s problem is attributable more to the 
cultural acceptance of inequality and norms within Brazil. High levels of racism – usually 
against the native, rural population, or lower class members in poor urban areas – contribute 
further to the continued stratification of Brazil. There are numerous barriers to social mobility as 
well: inequality of opportunity between poor and rich, and rural-urban disparities, poor education 
and human development, and entrenched class-structure. 
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Chapter 7 
Bolivia: Obstacles to Long-term Growth, Social Mobility and Wealth Redistribution 
Introduction 
 Bolivia provides us with a case contrasting perfectly with that of Brazil. It is arguably the 
poorest and least developed country in Latin America, an already underdeveloped region.  All 
indicators show it as well below other Latin American in terms of social development, and the 
country has experienced consistent levels of inequality. In fact, it has the most unequal 
distribution of wealth in Latin America, as rated by the Gini coefficient. (See Figure 7.1) 
In addition to analysis supply-and-demand fluctuations responding to the crisis and 
reform periods, and examination of the poor education institutions, we will find that the 
country’s history and numerous other factors play into their wage and income differential. 
Debt Crisis in Bolivia 
In the first half of the 1980s, similar to almost all other LACs, Bolivia suffered the effects 
of the external supply shocks and decreasing values of exports that led to decelerated growth and 
financial collapse (ECLAC, Total GDP). Worse yet, in 1982, the country had just established 
civilian democratic rule for the first time under freely elected president Soles Zuazo. In 1985, 
President Victor Paz Estenssoro seceded him only to face failing economy: thus, he was forced 
to begin the process of reform for Bolivia, or face a similar fate to those before him. 
Estenssoro Regime & Stabilization 
 Estenssoro and his advisors realized that to end the recession, they had to stabilize their 
currency. Of all the inflation-prone economies in Latin America, Bolivia was perhaps the most 
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vulnerable. In response, Estenssoro announced an overhaul in economic policy on August 29, 
1985. The Estenssoro regime succeeded in cutting inflation from 25,000 percent per year to only 
10.7 percent in 1987 (Sachs, 1986).  Estensorro’s policies eventually achieved monetary 
stabilization as the staples of his political agenda were encouraging capital inflows through 
liberal trade reform and capital regulations. 
As shown from data, with the exception of 1992, Bolivia experienced growth as a result of 
Estenssoro’s stabilization platform (Thiele, 2004)  Inward FDI flows surpassed one billion US$ 
in 1990, and the country continued with capital market deregulation and liberalization 
(Nunnenkamp, 2006).  Through this period of recession and growth, we now examine the forces 
acting on labor markets. 
Labor Market Effects 
Alcaraz (2008) decomposed observed changes in inequality into four components: 
1. Shifts related to changes in employment rates and shares of wage and non-
wage labor among employed population (participation effect) 
2. Shifts related to changes in the remuneration of observed characteristics of the 
employed population (price effect) 
3. a shift related to a change in the distribution of error terms of estimated 
earnings functions (error term effect) 
4. a residual change in inequality not captured by the first three simulated 
changes in the income distribution 
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Alcaraz’s findings suggest that 1 point in the Gini coefficient increase was explained by 
participation and the other 2 points by residual effects; this suggests that we must explore further 
what these residual effects are. 
From 1988-1990, Bolivia’s reforms had huge effects on labor markets: all data suggests 
there was a large restructuring in the employment across sectors during this period, with a 
notable shift from industrial to agricultural (See Figures 7.2 and 7.3). From 1988-1991, male 
employment in industry increased from 13.1% to 39.7%, while employment in agriculture fell by 
45% between 1988 and 1989 (ECLAC, Male Employment in Agriculture; Male Employment in 
Industry).  
The effects of this outward shift from the agricultural sector had no significant effects on 
income distribution (ECLAC, Quintile Distribution; Decile Distribution). Building off Spatz and 
Steiner in 2002, Nunnenkamp (2006) suggests reforms most benefitted skilled workers and 
unskilled workers who were previously employed in the informal sector, relative to unskilled 
workers in the formal sector. 
During these years, the minimum wage dropped from 53.2 (1988) to 40.6 in 1990 while 
annual GDP growth was 4.6% in 1990 (ECLAC, Salario Minimo Real; Total GDP). Falling 
wages must be caused in our model by either fluctuations in aggregate demand or supply of 
labor. Analyzing Bolivia’s FDI over this period, we see that this may have stimulated demand, 
which would account for mentioned later, this should theoretically help the income gap, but in 
the case of Bolivia, we see income distribution remain constant (ECLAC, FDI; Quintile; Decile). 
The evidence does confirm the effects of reform on the lower end of the distribution, witnessing 
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a drop from 1997-1999, but overall the Gini coefficient, decile and quintile analysis show 
income inequality is both perpetual and stable. 
Constraints on Job Creation and Labor Market Issues 
According to the Worldbank 2001 annual report, Bolivia has a thin localized labor market 
with burdensome business regulations. High costs in time and money for registration and 
operating licenses, and long delays in the process, make starting and running businesses difficult. 
Further, there are high capital requirements, high interest on loans, and difficulty obtaining 
credit. Growing supply of the labor force, describes the Worldbank 2001, creates “skilled labor 
bottlenecks”, driving the relative wage differential. Further, enforcement of contract and property 
rights is unpredictable in Bolivia. 
Other notable problems in Bolivia’s labor markets include: high transaction and 
information costs, high cost of logistics, and volatile market conditions, weak supply chains with 
expensive and slow transportation of goods, and generalized poor quality of domestic services 
and inputs in poor areas (Worldbank, 2001). The vast informal sector in Bolivia, which many 
workers turn to if they are unable to find work in the formal sector, may play a role in the 
inequality issue. According to Arias and Bendini (2008) informal sector workers, compared to 
workers with the same skills and job characteristics in the formal sector, do appear to have a 
significant disadvantage, particularly in the lower deciles of the income distribution. 
Ethnic and Rural-Urban Income Disparities 
Thiele and Weibelt (2004) further conclude that the rising skill premium for white collar 
workers, combined with rising wages relative to self-employed workers illustrates growing 
disparities in the urban labor market of Bolivia. Notes Arias (2006), 55% of workers in Bolivia 
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are employed in informal sector, which is characterized by low productivity, unskilled labor, and 
no labor or health benefits. Disparity between large and small firms: further illustrates this point: 
small firms employ 83% of labor force in Bolivia, producing only 25% of output by unskilled 
labor; conversely, large firms control only 9% of labor force, but produce 2/3 of output (arias, 
2006). We also note consistent gender wage disparities (See Figure 7.6). 
Education: Inequality of Opportunity and Barriers to Social Mobility 
 Similar to the case in Brazil, we see that low government expenditures in education lead 
to low quality and quantity of education in Bolivia. For this reason, we must not underestimate 
the effects of poor educational and social institutions, and opportunity inequality, on the 
distribution of income in Bolivia. High opportunity costs and low returns to education discourage 
enrollment and completion rates in schools (Arias, 2006). From this same data set, we observe 
other related outcomes: 
• Six out of ten graduates from high school are still at risk for poverty 
• In rural areas only post-secondary education offers significant boosts to earnings  
• There are large gaps between test scores of students in public schools and private schools 
• Rural teachers are generally unqualified and lacking in full training 
  As a result, all indicators suggest that impoverished rural inhabitants do not receive 
adequate opportunities to improve their human capital. This results in low labor productivity for 
a large portion of Bolivia and restricted access to better-paying jobs (Arias, 2006). Theoretically, 
low labor force productivity hinders output and thus growth potential; this may partially explain 
Bolivia’s low growth and cyclical boom-and-bust cycles (ECLAC, Total GDP).  
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What Does This Tell Us? 
 Primarily, we see that the same problems affecting both Brazil and Bolivia, despite the 
drastic differences in their development and national wealth. Low quality of education, 
especially in the rural regions where returns to education are low to begin with, leads to capital, 
compared with expensive, unaffordable private schools providing higher qualities of education; 
this drives the high wage differential, perpetuating stratification and remnants of class-structure 
from colonial history, all leading to the deeply-rooted nature of inequality in this region.  
 However, through decomposition of factors (see Yanez, 2009) we find that only between 
20- 30% of inequality is explained by differences in schooling, and between 12-16% is explained 
by occupational differences (Molina and Yanez, 2009).  This means so far we have only 
succeeded in explaining roughly half the causes of inequality in Bolivia.  
Health and Social Development Indicators: Racism and a Poor Social Climate 
 From the data we see observe that in 1995 Bolivia drastically improved its social sector 
spending, improving GDP output (See Figure 7.4 and ECLAC, Expenditures in Social Sector & 
Total GDP).  However, Bolivia still ranked higher than any other country in Latin America in 
their self-evaluations of racism, with nearly 17% of the population describing themselves as 
mistreated due to their ethnic-background (See Figure 7.5).   Compared to other countries, 
Bolivia also has a high adolescent birthrate, malnutrition prevalence, and infant mortality rates as 
well, suggesting that social sector spending is either unequally allocated between urban and rural 
residents, or that it is simply ineffective (See Figure 7.6).  Both of these likely add to the poor 
social and health climate, contributing to the low social cohesions and racial tensions that 
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promote inequality. There are numerous other social health indicators which Bolivia ranks 
poorly on (see Figure  7.7). 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 FDI plays a role in income inequality in Bolivia, but to what extent is unclear. FDI flows 
enhance growth in skilled labor sectors, but comparing FDI in Bolivia to inequality yields no 
conclusive results (ECLAC, FDI, Quintile and Decile). Nunnekamp (2006) reasons that inflows 
are generally concentrated in industrial, skill-intensive:
 
Rural-Urban Income Disparity 
 Related to the preceding discussion of increase FDI, we see that Bolivia transformed 
from rural to urban in less than two decades (Molina, Yanez, 2009). Significant wage premiums 
between urban and rural workers with the same skills and in the same occupation are the result of 
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this: a worker in urban areas makes anywhere 20% and 400% more than his or her identical 
counterpart in rural Bolivia (Molina and Yanez, 2009). 
 Relating also to our discussion of educational issues, the rural population is generally 
native, indigenous unskilled laborers or famers who have less access to educational 
opportunities. (Molina and Yarez, 2009). In their research, Molina and Yarez uncover a 
correlation between income and education that differs between indigenous and non indigenous 
population: returns from education are positive for all workers, but higher for non-indigenous 
workers with the same amount of education than for non-indigenous. Overall, this contributes to 
the problem of inequality, where rural areas have a noticeably higher incidence of poverty than 
urban zones (Thiele, 2004)  
 Even amongst the indigenous population there are great disparities, depending on region, 
local quality and availability of education and resources, and other cultural factors. For example, 
the Quechua population has averagely lower levels of education than the Aymara population 
(Yarez, 2009). Molina and Yanez propose that the combined share of GDP for the mining and 
manufacturing sectors remained constant over the 1985-1999 period, while the agricultural share 
decreased. They present evidence regarding low productivity of firms in the informal but labor 
intensive sector, affecting income inequality. In addition, their results fiscal retrenchment 
contributed to the inequality issue (Thiele, 2001). When the government was forced to downsize 
to reduce their debt burden and expenses, many public workers lost their jobs and were forced to 
seek employment in commercial activities in the industrial sector. 
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Other Contributing Factors 
 The low health and social spending leads to low social cohesiveness, resentment, and a 
politically unstable environment (ECLAC, Health and Social Expenditures). Racism between the 
native and migrant populations adds to the issue, with Bolivia ranking as the country in Latin 
America with the highest percentage of their population feeling mistreated or unfairly denied 
opportunities because of their skin color or race (see figure 49). Generally, as in Brazil, 
inequality is accepted as a cultural norm, with many elites actively denying lower class members 
opportunities for advancement. 
Conclusions 
 In summary, we see that the recession and reform periods in Bolivia in effect did not 
change income drastically. This is both good and bad: during the reform process many Latin 
American countries did experience improvements in their income distribution. In the case of 
Bolivia however, we see that stratification and unequal wage dispersion are so deeply entrenched 
in the culture that they transcend boom-and-bust cycles. 
 The major factors we identified in this chapter relate to the rural-urban divide within 
Bolivia, focusing on wage and employment gaps between native and non-native labor. Further, 
we considered the low quality of educational and human development institutions, especially in 
the rural regions described. Racism plays a large role, as those with higher education, resources, 
and power, can actively prevent the lower classes from advancing out of the lower socio-
economic classes.  
 Foreign direct investment plays an ambiguous role, again, for Bolivia: though it helped in 
ending the recession and spurring short-term growth, it ultimately led to a second crisis in the 
43 
 
late 1990s. Further, we observed that the capital inflows are generally directed towards skilled 
labor sectors, and favor the higher ends of the income distribution. 
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Chapter 8:  
Final Conclusions, Outcomes, Policy-Implications, and Applications 
“The Driving-Factor” Theory Explained and Defended 
 Throughout this examination, we focused on macroeconomic trends and labor markets to 
explain the consistent levels of inequality in regions of Latin America. Focusing on Brazil and 
Bolivia’s labor markets through periods of restructuring and reform, we found that reforms did 
perpetuate the high levels of inequality in Brazil and Bolivia during the considered periods, as 
they tended to promote wealth accumulation only by those in the upper or middle classes. 
 However, had this been the case, inequality being purely the result of economic policies 
and reforms surfacing through developmental cycles, then we would actually be relieved.  Indeed 
this would suggest that in order to end inequality, we would simply need to employ well thought-
out and carefully planned package of “pro-poor” reforms in place of market-friendly, 
deregulating policies that exhibit a bias towards skilled labor. 5 
 Instead, we find that cultural norms and deeper issues relating to education and ethnic 
composition drive high levels of inequality, regardless of economic and political climate. This 
problem is endemic in Latin America: the low education levels create self-sustaining forces that 
perpetuate cultural stereotypes and pass-on class-structures to future generations. Despite 
increases in education and social sector spending from 1990 to the present, literacy and 
enrollment rates in Latin America remain well below world averages, especially in countries 
                                                          
5
 Which some countries have attempted to do, with mixed effects, due to the culturally-rooted causes of income 
inequality in the region 
45 
 
with large rural populations. Unpredictable market conditions, combined with large informal 
sectors create labor markets that are volatile and hard to regulate, exacerbate the problems. 
External-shocks and other pressures on supply and demand for labor contribute to this problem. 
 In addition, we found that foreign direct investment, used to finance short-term growth, in 
many cases contributed to the perpetuation of inequality, advancing the status only of the middle 
and upper classes. Simultaneously, racism and elite perceptions of inequality as acceptable or 
intrinsic to the nature of their country lead to social stratification. In many instances, the upper 
classes have the resources and wealth to determine policy, and thus we see them actively 
preventing lower classes from advancing, to protect their status and wealth. 
First-Level and Second-Level Causes 
While the effects of FDI, debt, and other economic factors that contribute to inequality 
certainly explain a large portion of the inequality issue, these effects can be seen as secondary: 
the core issue of inequality lies in the lack of opportunities for social advancement through 
education. In this sense, the unequal distribution of educational opportunities and institutions is 
directly correlated with unequal distributions of wealth; these two are in fact one and the same. 
Low levels of education lead low productivity and participation in the labor force, decreasing 
growth, only leading to less national capital to invest in education; it is a cyclical process. 
Long-Term vs. Short-Term Growth 
 One of the greatest problems with inequality is that instead of enhancing educational 
opportunities across the country to produce long-term growth, governments in Latin America 
seek the faster route through developmental stages, investing large quantities of foreign capital 
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into emergent markets, at high cost. Though short term growth is generally positive in its effects 
on poverty, it does not decrease inequality but in these cases increases it.   
 Instead, governments, most importantly those in Latin America, need to concentrate on 
investing in long-term growth policies, specifically education and social development 
institutions. At the same time, they need to do this with as much internal capital as possible in 
order to avoid liquidity issues and debt-burdens, such that they can sustain their debt long 
enough to capitalize on the increases long-run returns from educational spending. Governments 
support inequality, either intentionally or inadvertently, often facing tough choices with short-
term consequences in recession periods. Especially in the inflation-prone economies of Latin 
America, the only way to stabilize currencies, end inflation, and promote growth is through 
deregulatory reforms and fiscal spending, yet it is precisely these measures that prohibit long-
term growth or social and educational institutions that would fix the labor markets. 
Policy-Implications: 
 This research seem to support one common trend: increasing education is the only way to 
guarantee long-term growth and stability in the labor markets. Though stabilization packages 
succeed in attaining growth, this often comes at the cost of equality. Simply put, if governments 
were to invest greater proportions of GDP into human capital development and social spending, 
they would see positive effects in the labor markets in the long-run. However, policies like this, 
especially in lesser-developed political systems, are generally unpopular. Further, developed 
countries such as the United States and Western European Nations do just this, and have varied 
results.  
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 For this reason, governments need to consider new ways to increase education levels. 
Investing in school-building and teacher training is a start, but ensuring that children desire to 
learn is an entirely different issue. Currently, children in rural Brazil or Bolivia have no concept 
of “long-run returns” to education; all they understand is that they are hungry, now, and school 
only takes time from them that they could better use around the house, helping with income-
generating tasks or farming. Accordingly, governments need to make clear the benefits of 
education, and encourage or even mandate that their countries residents receive education. 
Increasing the number of trained teachers and the quality of schools would increase education in 
the long-term, but these measures would be most effective if combined with other strategies of 
incentivizing youth enrollment in schools. If a mother is uneducated, her children likely will be 
as well; values are instilled in us from our family, thus instilling the importance of education in 
the minds of the population needs to be a high priority. 
 Another important implication is that governments need to actively work on changing 
cultural paradigms that promote racial discrimination and ethnic disparities. One of the reasons 
education rates remain so low is because the upper classes want it that way; it is in their best 
rational interest to maintain the status quo, as improving the income distribution would 
inevitably decrease their shares of national income. Owing to their aristocratic roots, a notion of 
meritocracy or freedom of social mobility is unheard of in Latin America, and changing this 
cultural mindset is perhaps the most difficult but also the most important task. 
 Increasing tolerance and decreasing racism is no easy task, as these are products of 
cultural norms. Changing cultural norms is something that transcends any political organization 
or leader, especially when class-structure is so deeply-entrenched in the socio-economic and 
political history of their country. However, realistically, if no one has the courage to stand 
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against the issues of class discrimination, these problems will simply persist or grow worse, 
indefinitely.  
 There are alternative routes to achieving wealth distribution, though they are generally 
equally unpopular. Increasing taxes on the wealthy could accomplish this, but this would be no 
easy task in Latin America. Similarly, increasing subsidies and labor returns in rural areas is 
another route; however these would be of limited value to an uneducated populous. Imposing 
strict labor market regulations relating to worker protections and raising minimum wages are 
policies that governments in Latin America should consider, as they are more feasible in the 
short-term.  
Why Income Inequality Matters  
 For one thing, as we just saw in Bolivia, inequality leads to negative health and social 
outcomes. Though this is a debated topic requiring much depth due to its complexity, it is worth 
highlighting a few of the relevant negative effects that income inequality has on social welfare. 
 Graham and Felton (2005) cite evidence and empirical works that show a negative 
correlation between inequality and individual welfare and happiness levels in Latin America. 
Corroborating past findings, they also suggest that the effects of perceived inequality may be just 
as detrimental as actual inequality in terms of individual happiness (Graham and Felton, 2005).  
In Latin America especially, income inequality has the affect of loosening social cohesion, 
creating tension between both those in the upper classes, who fear losing their status and wealth 
from the lower classes. Conversely, the lower classes resent the upper classes for having such a 
disproportionate share of wealth, which can and does in many cases lead to resentment, and even 
revolts or violence.  
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 Further, as briefly discussed in the first section of this report, income inequality does not 
only affect poor countries. The United States has a high and rising rate of inequality between the 
poorer classes and the working middle and wealthy classes, despite being one of the most 
advanced, developed nations in the world. This is unsettling, at best. Considering our standards 
of healthcare and education, our advanced technologies and wealth in both physical and human 
capital, we stand out as an anomaly in the field of income inequality.  
 Anna Bernasek (2005) summarizes recent work on the outcomes of inequality in the 
United States. Firstly, she notes, there is evidence that it has a negative effect on health, which 
also causes reductions in worker efficiency, and forces more public resources to be investing in 
health than other more productive sectors as a consequence. She also writes of the negative 
effects it can have in the political atmosphere, “breeding corruption” which “can hurt growth by 
reducing efficient allocation of public resources” (Bernasek, 2005). Edward Glaeser (2005) 
writes that unequal societies have less overall redistribution and generally are less likely to have 
stable, democratic forms of government with institutional protections of property rights.  Lastly, 
Bernasek (2005) goes on to write: “as the rich become richer and acquire greater political 
influence, they may support policies that make themselves even wealthier at the expense of 
others.” All in all, one thing is clear: income inequality is not just a statistic. Rather, it is a 
fundamental characteristic of modern society, with implications and effects all across the 
socioeconomic and political realms. 
Morality and Economic Rationale: On the Topic of Inequality 
 The topic of this paper is income inequality, not income inequity; one simply cannot 
prove that a more equal distribution is more just, as justice in itself is not objectively 
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quantifiable. At the same time, inequity involves not only what is fair, or just, but what is moral. 
Morality, however, has been defined and redefined by philosophers for centuries: what 
constitutes morality in one train of thought is promoting and protecting one’s own rational best 
interests (rational egoism), while, conversely, morality dictates that one should sacrifice their 
own happiness for the sake of others (altruism). Thus, the wealthy members of Latin America 
who actively restrain other classes from moving upward through the social hierarchy are by some 
definitions acting morally, while people holding opposing beliefs may be repulsed at the thought 
of taking away such a fundamental human right.  However, it is worth noting that extremely 
unequal distributions of income do lead to negative outcomes, and moreover, depriving someone 
of a fundamental right, such as freedom or education, is generally considered to be immoral.   
 On the issue of redistribution, one thing must be made clear: if an individual acquires 
wealth through proper channels (that is to say, he or she does not rob a bank), then that person is 
in entitled to that money, legally and morally insofar as they acquired it through a fair exchange 
of either capital, goods, or services. Thus, redistributing the wealth from rich to poor would be 
akin to suggesting that the poor, by virtue of their needing it more, are entitled to that money 
more so than the rich are; this would simply be the reversal of the current situation, wherein the 
rich hold that they deserve more income by virtue of them being born into a higher social class 
with ample opportunities for education and advancement. Thus, simply redistributing national 
wealth is not the solution, but rather a careful mix of policies aimed at increasing social capital, 
favoring pro-poor growth, and changing of cultural norms of intolerance and racism need to be 
of the highest priority.  
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Appendix, Graphs, and Tables 
                     
Figure 1.1:    Lorenz Curve                                                             
  
 
(source: http://ingrimayne.com/econ/AllocatingRationing/Figure6.5.gif) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1.2: Gini Diagram 
(source: http://img.search.com/thumb/5/5b/Economics_Gini_coefficient.svg/300px
Economics_Gini_coefficient.svg.png
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Figure 1.3: Basic Supply and Demand in Labor Markets 
 
 
 
http://www.colorado.edu/Economics/courses/econ2020/section5/gifs/fig53.gif 
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Figure 2.1: Kuznets U-Curve 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6b/Kuznets_curve.png 
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Source: ECLAC, (2010). Total Gross Domestic Product at Constant Market Prices [Data File]. Retrieved  
from ECLAC web site: <http://www.eclac.org/default.asp?idioma=IN>. 
 
*Note: Graph made by hand from  data 
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Green, Francis & Dickerson, Andy & Saba Arbache, Jorge. (2001). “A Picture of Wage 
Inequality and the Allocation of Labor through a Period of Trade Liberalization: The 
Case of Brazil.” World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1923-1939. 
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Souce: Green et al. 2001 
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6.1 
 
Note: Graph generated by World Databank 
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6.2 
 
Note: Graph made by hand from ECLAC data, y-axis in US $ 
6.3 
 
Note: Graph made by hand from ECLAC data, y-axis in % 
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6.4 
 
Note: Graph made by hand from ECLAC data 
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Note: Graph made by hand from ECLAC data 
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Source: Green et al. 2001 
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6.7 
 
Source: Green et al. 2001 
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6.8 
 
Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
6.9 
 
Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
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Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
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Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
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7.2 
 
Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
 
7.3 
 
Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
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Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
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Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
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Note: Graph made in Excel by hand from ECLAC data 
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myself. The values of integrity, hard-work, and love that I grew up with have truly made me into 
the man I am today; furthermore, I never would have been able to attend  Claremont McKenna 
College if not for the financial aid of my mother and father, and for this I am infinitely grateful, 
as I wouldn’t trade all the money in the world in exchange for my educational and formative 
experiences the last 4 years. Also, along these lines, I thank all my friends, especially in the last 
two weeks, who provided me with unending support, even through the dark all-nighters and 30 
hour stints. It is loyalty, love, and care that motivates me to put friends before myself, and seeing 
this reciprocated from my friends and family in the past 2 weeks has been truly inspirational. 
In addition, I would like to also acknowledge my professors from IES Madrid, and my 
abroad experiences, which put me in direct-contact for the first time in my life with equity, 
poverty, and distribution issues. After all, it was on a train ride across Portugal that first 
implanted in my mind the question that is at the heart of this thesis. I consider the global 
perspective I gained in my time abroad to be one of the largest contributors to my maturity and 
growth over my college years, and also in expanding and redefining my value-system. 
Lastly, I would like to thank whomsoever took their time to read this thesis. My hopes are 
that I did this topic justice in the month that I devoted to it, and that you found this analysis to be 
both informative, well-argued, and interesting. 
Best regards, and thank you all so much, 
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